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Negligent Programming

RETORT!
Negligent Programming?
Some First Amendment
Ramifications

BY HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN

BY FLOYD ABRAMS

Being the case for the proposition that the Californiaand
Rhode Island courts erred in extending first amendment
protection to media whose negligentprogrammingcauses
personalinjury to those in the audience.
Maybe it's the torts professor in me overwhelming the
communications law pedagogue, Floyd, but I am convinced
that the decisions in Olivia N. v. NBC, 126 Cal. App. 3d
488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), and DeFilippo v. NBC,
- R.I. ___ 446 A.2d 1036 (1982), are just plain wrong.
In those cases your client, the National Broadcasting Company, was held to be protected against personal injury
liability in tort for allegedly negligent programming by the
first amendment.
In the OliviaN. case, a minor female was "bottle raped"
by other minors at a San Francisco beach following the
presentation on the NBC television network of a film entitled Born Innocent in which an adolescent female inmate
of a state-run home for wayward girls is sexually attacked
in a shower room by other inmates wielding a "plumber's
helper." In the DeFilippo case, a thirteen-year-old boy
accidently hanged himself while apparently emulating a trick hanging
demonstrated by Johnny
Carson and a Hollywood
stunt man on NBC's
"Tonight Show."
While I believe, Floyd,
that in neither case
should your client have
been held liable for
damages in tort, I also
believe that it received
unwarranted protection
of the first amendment.
Regarding tort liability
for negligent programming, it is a basic proposition of tort law that a
defendant can only be
negligent if it creates

Being the case against the proposition that the California
and Rhode Island courts erred in extending first amendment protection to the media in this situation.
The questions forcefully put, if wrongly answered, by
Harvey Zuckman are best considered in a hypothetical
framework. Consider the following wholly fictional creation:
1. In the weeks following the reporting of the Tylenol
deaths, similar acts of poison being inserted in publicly
sold drug products occur around the nation.
2. Two people in Cleveland die as a result of such actions.
3. A Cleveland resident is apprehended who claims that
he "got the idea" to poison the drugs from reports he
had seen and read.
4. Some social scientists believe that the reporting of the
Tylenol deaths foreseeably led to imitative acts by
members of the public.
5. An action is commenced by the widow of one of the two
deceased Cleveland victims against a local newspaper
and television station.
What result?
I take it, Harvey, that
you and I agree on the
answer. There can be no liability imposed upon the
newspaper and television
station. But why? What
analysis leads to that conclusion?
Here we disagree. Your
analysis is rooted in-I
would say mired in-negligence law. Mine is
premised upon the first
amendment. What difference does it all make?
Let's see.
Under principles of negligence law, you rightly
say, the test is one of reasonableness. We should
C~
weigh, you say, the prob-
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unreasonable risks to others by its conduct. The mere airing of a motion picture containing a sexual assault should
not qualify as unreasonable, utilizing
Judge Learned Hand's famous test balancing the probability of the risk and
the gravity of the risk against the
burden of alternative conduct.
In Olivia N. the risk that someone
might emulate the film's sexual assault
scene has to be considered small from the
perspective of foresight. Concededly, the
gravity of the risk, i.e., rape or simulated
rape, is substantial, but the burden here
on NBC would be to avoid ever broadcasting any program involving a sexual
assault scene. Thus, an entire genre of
dramas and docudramas would be ruled
off the air. Such a burden would have to
outweigh the risks involved, and hence
the airing of individual programs with
such scenes ought not to be considered
negligent.
Likewise, with the DeFilippo case, a
whole area of broadcasting would be
wiped out if the programming of
daredevil stunts was held to be
unreasonable and the burden of refraining from such programming would be
too great to impose tort liability.
Moreover, in DeFilippo the stuntman

conducting the trick hanging cautioned
the audience against trying the trick
themselves. "Believe me, it's not something that you want to go and try. This is
a stunt . . . ." He then added, "I've seen
people try things like this. I really have. I
happen to know somebody who did
something similar to it, just fooling
"
around, and almost broke his neck. ....
Simply stated, there was no negligence in
either DeFilippo or Olivia N.
But, Floyd, I can understand NBC
counsel's reluctance to try the case on
tort grounds. First, disposing of a
negligent case on summary judgment is
rare since the issue of negligence is normally for the jury, and second, we all
know the bias against the media that
jurors very often harbor.
I believe the proper approach to this
problem is the one taken by the California Supreme Court in Weirum v. RKO
General,Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36,
123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975). There, a radio
station with a rock music format aimed
primarily at a teenage audience conducted a contest which rewarded the first
audience member to locate "the real
Don Steele," one of its disc jockeys
assigned to move around the Los Angeles
metropolitan area. Once Steele was
found, with the aid of broadcast information, the first contestant on the scene
could win a modest cash prize by answering some question about the station and
its programming.
The Bettman Archive

Ku Klux Kiansmen saluting the flag and the fiery cross in a photo taken during the
Klan's resurgence in the 1920s. In 1969, the Supreme Court held in Brandenburg
that a Klansman could not be convicted unless his speech produced "imminent
lawless action." The case sets the first amendment standard applicable to speech
that may threaten third parties.

In an attempt to be first on the scene
at one of the disc jockey's stops, two
teenagers began following Steele's
vehicle from the point of his previous
stop, weaving in and out of freeway traffic and reaching speeds of up to 80 miles
an hour. In the course of this pursuit,
one of the teenagers forced Mr.
Weirum's car on to the center divider
where it overturned, killing him.
In upholding a verdict and judgment
against the radio station owner for
wrongful death, the California Supreme
Court used a traditional negligence
analysis. It found that the station owed
a duty of due care to Weirum because
he was within a foreseeable class of persons i.e., motorists and pedestrians
along Steele's route, put at risk by the
station's encouragement of its teenage
listeners, who were out of school for the
summer, to be the first to reach "the
real Don Steele" over the roadways of
Los Angeles.
The breach of that duty was clear to
the court when it compared the grave
risk of death or serious injury raised by
the defendant's contest with the burden
of running this particular contest.
Regarding the issue of the teenagers
as intervening cause cutting off the station owner's liability (the proximate
cause issue), the court restated the
modern view that third-party wrongdoing upon a stage set by the defendant's negligent conduct will not cut off
the defendant's liability when such
third-party intervention could reasonably be anticipated. And here it was the
creation of the risk of third-party
negligent driving that made defendant
negligent in the first place.
Having determined that the verdict
and judgment were correct insofar as
traditional negligence law is concerned,
the court then rejected the station
owner's contention that its programming was protected by the first amendment. "The issue here," the court said,
"is civil accountability for the
foreseeable results of a broadcast which
created an undue risk of harm to defendant. The First Amendment does not
sanction the infliction of physical injury
merely because it was achieved by work,
rather than act." (15 Cal. 3d at 48, 123
Cal. Rptr. at 472.)
The California court was obviously
concerned that physical injuries to innocent persons caused by careless use of
the media not go uncompensated and
refused to believe that a broadcaster

could hide behind the first amendment
after causing such injuries.
At least so long as the U.S. Supreme
Court continues to permit liability of
the media for negligent defamation of
private persons under its decision in
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct.
2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974), Twill support the California Supreme Court's
decision in Weirum. In departing from
the broad principles of New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710,
11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), encouraging
robust expression by the media, the
Court in Gertz recognized that some
persons unfairly hurt by such expression, i.e., the private person caught up
in newsworthy matters, had no way of
defending himself against the injury
and little chance to obtain recompense
under the actual malice standard of
New York Times v. Sullivan. In permitting the states to adopt a negligence
standard for determining media
culpability in defamation cases involving private persons, the Court was clearly saying that tort liability of the media
was alive and well in the face of first
amendment claims. I fail to see what is
so different about the torts of defamation that allow one to recover from the
media for injury to reputation occasioned by negligence but not for physical injury or death occasioned by
similar negligence.
Frankly, Floyd, if I had my druthers,
I'd prefer to have my reputation dented
rather than my body. If I can collect for
dented reputation a la Gertz, a fortiori I
ought to be able to collect for physical
injury to my person caused by negligent
media programming. It was unfair and
unprincipled for the courts in Olivia N.
and DeFilippo to turn the plaintiffs
away on first amendment grounds.
Those courts ignored the constitutional standard for tort liability of the
media established in Gertz and relied
on the inapposite "incitement" test of
Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89
S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969).
Weirum was disposed of in Olivia N.
with the oblique suggestion that it was
an "incitement" case like that of
Brandenburg and was largely ignored
in DeFilippo.
To indicate the shakiness of the decisions favoring NBC, I would first point
out that in DeFilippo,the Rhode Island
Supreme Court states as dogma that
there are "four classes of speech which
may legitimately be proscribed ... "

including incitement to imminent
lawless action. While I would agree with
you, Floyd, that the less proscriptionof
free speech the better, where is it written that there are four proscriptions,
and only four? And do these proscriptions, alluded to by the Rhode Island
court on June 15, 1982, include, for
instance, the sexual, though not
necessarily obscene, exploitation of
children by movie makers condemned
by New York statute and the U.S.
Supreme Court on July 2, 1982? See
New York v. Ferber,458 U.S. .. 102
S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982).
Not likely!
Moving from questionable dogma to
erroneous case analysis, the courts' acceptance of the "incitement" test ignores the possibility that in radically
different contexts different standards
may be applied. The criminal syndicalism statute in Brandenburg was
directed toward forbidding or proscribing speech that advocated the use of
force or violations of law to overthrow
the existing social order.
Working on the principle that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a state to
forbid or proscribe such advocacy except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce
such action, the Court struck down the
statute and reversed the conviction of a
Klansman orator obtained under it.
But what has this to do with a state
permitting a private common-law tort
action to provide recompense for personal injuries caused by someone
negligently communicating with
others? I submit, nothing at all. The
state's action in permitting such suits
neither forbids nor proscribes negligent
communications. All that is involved is
imposition of liability if and only if such
communications result in harm to
others. Since negligent expression is
neither proscribed nor forbidden by
penalty of law, the "incitement" test,
which is designed to limit proscription
of free speech, is totally inappropriate
here.
What we have in these cases, Floyd, is
the classic example of someone, here
NBC, exercising its right of free speech
and allegedly doing so negligently.
Traditionally, when one's exercise of a
right is done in a wrongful way and
injury is caused to another, the injury
must still be recompensed.

9

Harvey L. Zuckman

I salute counsel for NBC for the persuasiveness with which they made their
case but deplore the actions of the appellate judges involved in buying it.
Harvey L. Zuckman is Director of the
Institute for Communications Law
Studies and Professor of Law at the
Catholic University School of Law,
Washington, D.C.
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bill exempted from disclosure any such
information. The committee did, however, reject a business community proposal to exempt all information a business submitter considers confidential
and to require the CFTC to notify submitters before releasing information.
Concern over the crazy quilt of exemptions has focused less upon the
need for their substance than upon the
insidious way they have found their way
into the FOIA. Public interest groups
have proposed internal chamber rules
that would permit only direct amendments to the act or would at least require referral of proposals to committees in Congress with FOIA responsibility, where they might at least get a
hearing before passage. Such rules are
not likely to be adopted, because even
FOIA lovers on the Hill aver that the
backdoor amendment is a good downand-dirty way on occasion to do what
can't be done in the daylight.
Tonda Rush is Directorof the Freedom
of Information Service Center, a joint
project of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press and the Society of
Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta
Chi.

